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Since technologies have been developing rapidly, Wireless Body Area Network 
(WBAN) has emerged as a promising technique for healthcare systems. People can 
monitor patients’ body condition and collect data remotely and continuously by using 
WBAN with small and compact wearable sensors. These sensors can be located in, on, 
and around the patient’s body and measure the patient’s health condition. Afterwards 
sensor nodes send the data via short-range wireless communication techniques to an 
intermediate node. The WBANs deal with critical health data, therefore, secure 
communication within the WBAN is important. There are important criteria in designing 
a security protocol for a WBAN. Sensor nodes in a WBAN have limited computation 
power, battery capacity, and limited memory. Therefore, there have been many efforts to 
develop lightweight but secure authentication protocols. In this thesis, a computationally 
efficient authentication protocol based on Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC) and 2D 
hash chain has been proposed. This protocol can provide high level security and require 
significantly low computation power on sensor nodes. In addition, a novel key selection 
algorithm has been proposed to improve efficiency of key usage and reduce computation 
cost. For this protocol, ECC is used for key exchange and key encryption. The scheme 
encrypts a key with ECC to create a pair of points and uses this pair of points as keys for 
an intermediate node and sensor nodes. 2D hash chain technique is used for generating 
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2D key pool for authentication procedure. This technique can generate many keys 
efficiently and effectively with hash functions. For security part, this protocol provides 
essential security features including mutual authentication, perfect forward security, 
session key establishment, and etc., while providing high level security. In experimental 
results, this protocol reduced sensor nodes’ computation cost significantly by using 
combination of ECC and 2D hash chain. Moreover, the computation cost on the 
intermediate node has been reduced to 48.2% of the existing approach by the new key 
selection algorithm at an initial authentication. After the initial authentication, the 
intermediate node’s computation cost is further reduced to 47.1% of the initial 
authentication by eliminating synchronization phase. In addition, communication cost 
which is the total packet size of all messages is 1280-bits, which is 5392-bits smaller than 
the existing approach, for entire authentication and after the initial authentication the cost 




Interest in the healthcare area is growing since the population of elderly people in 
the world is increasing and they need healthcare systems for checking their health 
condition constantly [1]. Also, the development of technologies such as wireless 
communication, compact sensors, and low-power integrated circuits allows people make 
a new system called Wireless Body Area Network (WBAN) and this system has emerged 
as a promising technique for healthcare systems by providing remote and continuous 
patients’ health condition monitoring system with small sensors [2-4]. WBAN consists of 
sensor nodes and an intermediate node (called as a server for convenience) which collects 
data from sensor nodes. In addition, there is Key Distribution Center to generate keys and 
system parameters and to distribute them. This thesis focuses on an authentication 
protocol between the sensors and the server node and tries to solve existing approaches’ 
problems. The architecture of the WBAN is shown in Figure 1. The small sensors will be 
placed in, on, and around the patient’s body and collect vital body function. Afterwards, 
the sensors send collected data to the server via short-range wireless communication. 
Since the sensors are attached to the patient’s body for a long time to collect data, they 
need to be smaller and more compact. As a result, they cannot have a huge battery 
capacity and powerful computation ability. Therefore, to make the sensors have low 
battery consumption and low computation power is one of WBAN’s challenges [5]. In 
addition, due to using a shared network for data transaction, it may have malicious 
attacks from unexpected adversaries [6]. Moreover, since human body function data such 
as electrocardiogram (ECG), blood pressure, blood sugar, etc., is sensitive and critical, 
the data should be checked before any transactions begin because if the data is modified 
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viciously, it may negatively affect the patients’ health. Therefore, security of WBAN is 
becoming more and more important [7, 8].  
 
A secure and lightweight authentication protocol by applying Elliptic Curves 
Cryptography (ECC) with 2D hash chain is proposed to solve WBAN’s problems [17]. 
However, this protocol has two problems. The first problem is that the server had to 
calculate too many hash functions to get keys. The second problem is that the key usage 
of a two-dimensional key pool is not efficient. Therefore, a key selection algorithm is 
modified to reduce the server’s calculations and to increase the efficiency of key usage.  
 Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC) is a public-key cryptography tool based on 
an algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite fields. ECC can use properties of an 
elliptic curve instead of big prime numbers like RSA, therefore, ECC offers the same 
security level as other widely deployed schemes with a smaller key [9, 10].  
 
Figure 1. The architecture of Wireless Body Area Network 
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A hash chain technique is a successive application of a cryptographic hash 
function to a string key. A hash function is mathematical algorithm that maps arbitrary 
length data to fixed length data. In addition, it is designed as one-way function, therefore, 
it is practically infeasible to invert [11]. Thus, a hash function is a powerful and 
computationally efficient cryptography tool for WBAN [11].  
As a result, ECC and hash functions are the most suitable cryptography schemes 
for resource constrained WBAN. Due to these characteristics, there have been many 
previous works. ECC is used as a key encryption and a key exchange technique, and the 
2D hash chain technique is used as a key generation technique in this thesis. For 2D hash 
chain, SHA-256 is used as the main hash function and SHA-512 is used as the sub hash 
function. The combination of these techniques can make the authentication protocol more 
secure and computationally efficient, especially on the sensor side. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section III, the related work is 
briefly discussed. ECC and 2D hash chain are introduced in Section IV. The improved 
random key selection method and the proposed authentication protocol model’s 
Initialization, Synchronization, and Authentication phases are described in Section V. 
Performance analysis and security analysis of our protocol are presented in Section VI. 




 In WBAN, it uses the wireless network and measured data from sensors is 
sensitive and life-relevant information, therefore a lot of work is focused on the security 
of data transaction [12, 13]. Moreover, they are trying to make lightweight authentication 
protocols since WBAN has restrictions about sensor’s battery capacity and computation 
power [14, 15]. The sensor’s size should be small-scale and minimized for the patient’s 
convenience. Thus, the sensors do not have space for a big battery and some computation 
parts such as CPU, memory, etc. As a result, lightweight computation for authentication 
protocol is required. Several papers [12-15] about lightweight and secure authentication 
protocol for WBAN by applying ECC or/and hash functions are proposed which used the 
same techniques as this proposed protocol.  
He, D et al. [12] proposed an anonymous authentication protocol for WBAN by 
applying an ECC based multiplication and hash function. Their protocol has reduced the 
computation burden on the client side which is a sensor side, and it has provable security. 
In [12], however, there are still several computations on sensors to verify that keys are 
correct or not. This means that the sensors are required to have some computation 
abilities and battery capacity because more computation leads to high battery 
consumption and requires sensors to have more powerful computation ability. Another 
anonymous authentication protocol proposed by K. Sowjanya et al. [13] is an enhanced 
lightweight ECC based end-to-end authentication protocol. This protocol removed the 
security vulnerabilities of the scheme of Li et al. [16] as well as reducing the overall 
complexity to reduce computation cost. Unfortunately, however, the sensors still need to 
compute two or more complicated calculations such as big number modular operation 
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and ECC based multiplications. M. Nikooghadam and H. Amintoosi et al. [14] proposed 
a secure and robust elliptic curve cryptography-based mutual authentication scheme. 
Their protocol was not for WBAN and the health care area, but they used ECC for the 
authentication protocol and tried to reduce computation costs on the user side, which is 
the same side as the sensors in a WBAN system. However, this protocol has the same 
problems as the other two protocols. They reduced some computations from entire 
protocol procedure, but the sensors still need to make several computations for 
authentication. In [15], Kumar et al. introduced a lightweight cloud-assisted 
authentication for WBAN. They used cloud technology to provide an identity-based 
anonymous authentication and key agreement (IBAAKA) protocol for WBAN. However, 
their protocol’s computation cost is higher than [14]. A secure and lightweight 
authentication protocol has been proposed [17]. This protocol significantly reduced the 
sensors’ computation cost and provided high level security by combining ECC and 2D 
hash chain techniques. The protocol has, nevertheless, two problems: inefficient key 
usage and too many hash calculations required on the server.  
To solve these protocols’ problems, the random key selection algorithm in the 
authentication protocol is improved while maintaining the security level. Through the 
improved random key selection algorithm, the efficient of key usage for the 2D key pool 
is increased and the number of hash function calculations on the server is reduced. In 
addition, this random selection algorithm does not require any complicated calculations 
on the sensors. The sensors only need to compare keys from the server with the 2D key 
pool and generate random numbers. As a result, this protocol can provide high level 
6 






Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is one of several public key cryptography 
tools, which is a cryptography system that uses pairs of keys. This pair of keys consists of 
a public key and a private key [5, 18]. ECC is based on the algebraic structure of elliptic 
curves over a finite field, and it has been confirmed as an efficient and effective scheme 
[9, 10]. ECC can provide a 128-bit security level with a 256-bits key. This means that 
when ECC uses the same length of key as other schemes, it can provide a higher level of 
security. In addition, this technique uses properties of an elliptic curve instead of two 
very large prime numbers. As a result, ECC can also provide lower cost computation. 
Accordingly, it has an important advantage over the use of smaller keys to provide the 
same level of security [10]. Thus, ECC is a perfect tool for resource-constrained 
applications since it can provide high level security with low battery consumption and 
low computation power. 
 Elliptic curves are a plane algebraic curve, and they are symmetrical over the x-
axis defined by an equation of the form (1): 
𝑦! = 𝑥" + 𝑎𝑥 + 𝑏 (1) 
 
where x and y are the standard variables that define the function while a and b are the 
constant coefficients that define the curve under the condition 4𝑎" + 27𝑏! ≠ 0 [18]. 
 The operations used on elliptical curves in cryptography are point addition and 
point doubling. The point addition “ + ” is defined as follows: Let the order of 𝐺 be 𝑔, let 
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𝐺 be an additive cyclic group on an elliptic curve. Let 𝑃, 𝑄	 ∊ 𝐺, 𝑙 be a line containing 𝑃 
and 𝑄, and let 𝑅 be the third point of intersection of 𝑙 with the elliptic curve. Let 𝑙’ be a 
line connecting 𝑅 and 𝑅’ which is a point of x-axis symmetry of 𝑅. Then 𝑃 + 𝑄 is the 
point such that 𝑙’ intersects the elliptic curve at 𝑅 and 𝑅’. Scalar multiplication over the 
elliptic curve can be computed as follows: 𝑘 ∗ 𝑃	 = 	𝑃 + 𝑃 +⋯+ 𝑃	(𝑘 times) [18]. 
Encryption and decryption of ECC are defined as follows: Assume that a sender wants to 
send a message 𝑥 to a receiver. For encryption, there are 3 steps. First, let 𝑥 be any point 
on the elliptic curve. Second, the sender selects a random number 𝑘 from [1, 𝑔 − 1]. 
Third, the encrypted message will be a pair of points 𝑚#, 𝑚! where 𝛽 = 𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑃, 𝑚# =
𝑘 ∗ 𝑃, 𝑚! = 𝑥 + 𝑘 ∗ 𝛽, 𝑃 is a generator point on the curve and 𝑝𝑘 is a private key. For 
decryption, the receiver gets the 𝑚#, 𝑚! from the server and decrypts them as follows: 
𝑥 = 	𝑚! − (𝑝𝑘 ∗ 𝑚#) [18]. 
 
2D Hash Chain: SHA-256 and SHA-512 
Hash functions, such as SHA-1 and SHA-2, are computationally efficient and 
powerful cryptography tools. A hash function is a mathematical algorithm that maps 
arbitrary length data to fixed length data. In addition, it is designed as one-way function, 
therefore, this function is practically infeasible to invert [11]. A hash chain method is a 
successive application of a cryptographic hash function to a string key. It can produce 
many one-time keys from a single key by computing a hash function in succession [19]. 
SHA-256 and SHA-512, which generate 256-bits and 512-bits of digested 
messages respectively, are used for 2D hash chain. SHA-256 as the main hash function 
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ℎ$ and SHA-512 as the sub hash function ℎ% are applied to create an 𝑁	 × 	𝑁 hash chain 
key pool. At first, this algorithm performs ℎ% with a string key. After the first step, it 
applies ℎ$ with the result of the first step 𝑛 − 1 times to fill up the first row’s columns of 
the key pool. To fill up the second row’s columns, it computes ℎ% with the result of the 
first step and then performs ℎ$ with itself 𝑛 − 1 times. It does continue to compute ℎ% 
with the previous step’s result 𝑛 − 1 times and ℎ$ with each result of ℎ% 𝑛 − 1 times. 
Figure 2 shows the completed key pool created by the 2D hash chain technique. 
 
 This key pool will be different when using different initial keys. Therefore, the 
2D hash chain technique is able to create different key pools for each sensor with 
different keys as shown in Figure 3. When ECC encrypts a message 𝑥 which is some 
point of the elliptic curve, it gets a pair of points 𝑚#, 𝑚! as explained earlier. A server 
will have 𝑚# and the sensors will each have 𝑚!. Moreover, new 𝑚! which is interactive 
 
Figure 2. 𝑁	𝑥	𝑁 key pool created by 2D hash chain technique 
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with current 𝑚# can be produced through a reverse computation method. The reverse 
computation concept is defined as follows: 𝐸𝐶𝐶&(() =	𝑚#, 𝑚! → 𝐸𝐶𝐶*($!, &-	$") =
𝑛𝑒𝑤	𝑥. Encrypt the 𝑥 with ECC to get 𝑚#, 𝑚! and decrypt 𝑚#	and 𝑛𝑒𝑤	𝑚! to get new 𝑥. 
Thus, it can create one 𝑚# for the sever, and multiple 𝑚!/, for each sensor. 
 
Furthermore, to make this authentication scheme more secure, hash functions are 
modified to use a private key. Since SHA-256 and SHA-512 are open-source 
cryptography techniques, everyone can compute these methods exactly the same as you 
do if they know hash functions’ key [20]. Thus, we need to secure hash function’s key or 
modify hash function itself. By using the private key, key pools can contain different 
keys according to the private key. As a result, many key pools can be produced with one 
server’s key, and attackers cannot produce the same key pool if they do not have the 
private key. The modified hash function concept is defined as follows: There is a round 
function in each hash function and this process is repeated 64 times for SHA-256 and 80 
times for SHA-512. Each round takes a fixed size input, which is a combination of the 
most recent message block and the output of the last round, and the input is sliced into 8 
 
Figure 3. Different key pools created by different keys 
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pieces as a, b, c, ..., h [20]. The sequence of sliced pieces of the input is changed by using 




 In this section, the improved key selection algorithm and the proposed 
authentication model’s 3 steps are described. For this protocol, several notations are used 
for ECC and hash function calculation. Table 1 shows notations used in this paper. 𝐸 is 
an equation for ECC, 𝐺 is a generator point on the elliptic curve, 𝑝 is a prime number for 
modular operation, 𝑘 is a random number for ECC, 𝑝𝑘 is a private key for ECC, 𝑛 is the 
number of sensors, 𝑘𝑒𝑦 is a point on the elliptic curve, 𝑚#, 𝑚! are a pair of the encrypted 
𝑘𝑒𝑦, ℎ$ and ℎ% are the main and sub hash functions, 𝑝𝑘0 is a private key for hash 
functions, 𝑘𝑝 is a two-dimensional key pool, 𝑟 and 𝑐 are the row and column number for 
key selection algorithm, 𝑘𝑒𝑦1 and 𝑘𝑒𝑦2 are keys for synchronization, and 𝑘𝑒𝑦13 and 
𝑘𝑒𝑦23 are keys for authentication. 
Table 1. Notations 
Symbol Description 
𝐸  An equation for ECC 
𝐺  A generator point on the elliptic curve 
𝑝  A prime number for modular operation 
𝑘  A random number for ECC 
𝑝𝑘  A private key for ECC 
𝑛  The number of sensors 
𝑘𝑒𝑦  A point on the elliptic curve 
𝑚#, 𝑚!  A pair of the encrypted 𝑘𝑒𝑦 
ℎ$  The main hash function 
ℎ%  The sub hash function 
𝑝𝑘0  A private key for hash functions 
𝑘𝑝  A two-dimensional key pool 
𝑟  The row number for key selection 
𝑐  The column number for key selection 
𝑘𝑒𝑦1   Sensor’s key for synchronization 
𝑘𝑒𝑦2  Server’s key for synchronization 
𝑘𝑒𝑦13  Sensor’s key for authentication 
𝑘𝑒𝑦23  Server’s key for authentication 
 
13 
Subtraction-Modular Random Key Selection 
  
 When the protocol produces the 2D hash key pool, there are keys as many as 
𝑁	 × 	𝑁. Each sensor will have a different key pool and select one key for each 
authentication procedure. Thus, a key selection algorithm is required for the 
authentication. The Random Key Selection algorithm was proposed which generates a 
random number between 1 and 3, and if the number is 1 (case 1), then a new key will be 
above the current position. If the generated number is 3 (case 3), then a new key will be 
left of the current position. If the random number is 2 (case 2), then generate a new 
random number and restart at a diagonal from the current position [17]. However, this 
algorithm has problems. If the case 2 continues to be generated, then it could encounter 
the worst case. The worst case means that only 1 key out of 25 keys is used for a 5	 × 	5 
key pool as shown in Figure 4. Moreover, the bad cases occur when the case 1 (or 3) 
continues to be generated. The bad case means that only 4 keys out of 25 keys are used 
 
Figure 4. The worst case of random key selection algorithm 
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for a 5	 × 	5 key pool as shown in Figure 5. Therefore, this algorithm is needed to be 
redesigned to solve these problems.  
The new algorithm randomly generates the column number and calculates the row 
number for the 2D key pool. The algorithm is defined as follows: When the sensor selects 
a key from the key pool, the column number (𝑐) will be randomly generated by the 
sensor. After that it subtracts 𝑘𝑒𝑦4 from the previous key of 𝑘𝑒𝑦4 (𝑝_𝑘𝑒𝑦). Then it 
performs a modular operation with 𝑛 to get the row number (𝑟). As a result, 𝑘𝑒𝑦5(𝑟, 𝑐) 
 
Figure 5. The bad cases of random key selection algorithm 
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will be selected as a new key. This algorithm increased the efficiency of key usage from 
16% to 90%. In addition, it reduced the number of calculations on the server from 83 
times to 35 times (42.1%). 
 
Initialization  
 Key Distribution Center (KDC) defines keys and system parameters and generates 
the two-dimensional key pool. After that KDC distributes parameters, keys, and the 2D 
key pool to the server and sensors. Figure 6 shows the initialization phase, and the 
initialization phase is defined as follows:  
 
(1) KDC defines system parameters such as 𝐸, 𝐺, 𝑝, 𝑘, 𝑝𝑘, 𝑛, 𝑘𝑒𝑦, ℎ$, ℎ%, 𝑝𝑘0 . 
(2) 𝐸 is an equation, 𝐺 is a generator point on the elliptic curve, 𝑝 is a prime number 
for modular operation, 𝑘 is a random number, 𝑝𝑘 is a private key for ECC, 𝑛 is 
 
Figure 6. Initialization 
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the number of sensors, 𝑘𝑒𝑦 is a point on the elliptic curve, ℎ$ and ℎ% are the main 
and sub hash functions, and 𝑝𝑘0 is a private key for hash functions. 
(3) KDC creates two-dimensional key pool 𝑘𝑝 by calculating the main and sub hash 
functions with 𝑘𝑒𝑦 as explained in IV.2 2D hash chain section. After that KDC 
encrypts 𝑘𝑒𝑦 with ECC to get a pair of keys 𝑚# and 𝑚! for the server and sensor. 





 The server and sensor synchronize each other’s key and 2D key pool to verify 
each other in the synchronization phase. Figure 7 shows the synchronization phase, and 
the synchronization phase is defined as follows: 
(1) At first, the server sends a request to the sensor to begin authentication.  
(2) When the sensor receives the request from the server, it selects the last key of the 
2D key pool which is 𝑘𝑝(𝑛 − 1, 𝑛 − 1) as 𝑘𝑒𝑦1 and sends 𝑚!, 𝑛, and 𝑘𝑒𝑦1 back 
to the server. 
(3) The server decrypts 𝑚! received from the sensor with its 𝑚# by ECC to get 𝑘𝑒𝑦. 
After that, the server computes the main hash function ℎ$	 and the sub hash 
function ℎ% 𝑛 − 1 times and	𝑛 − 2 times respectively to get 𝑘𝑒𝑦2 as explained. 
2D hash chain section. If 𝑘𝑒𝑦1 from the sensor is matched with 𝑘𝑒𝑦2 with 1 more 
computation of the main hash function, the server sends 𝑘𝑒𝑦2 to the sensor and 
saves its previous key as 𝑝_𝑘𝑒𝑦2. If 𝑘𝑒𝑦1 is not matched with 𝑘𝑒𝑦2 with 1 more 
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computation of the main hash function, consider the sensor to not belong to the 
system and reject this sensor. 
(4) The sensor compares 𝑘𝑒𝑦2 received from the server with the previous key of the 
𝑘𝑒𝑦1 which is 𝑘𝑝(𝑛 − 1, 𝑛 − 2). If they are matched, the sensor subtracts 
𝑘𝑝(𝑛 − 1, 𝑛 − 2) from	𝑝_𝑘𝑒𝑦 which is the previous key of 𝑘𝑝(𝑛 − 1, 𝑛 − 2). 
After that, perform modular operation to the result with 𝑛 to get the row number 
𝑟. The sensor randomly generates the column number 𝑐. Afterwards, (r, c) will be 
selected as 𝑘𝑒𝑦13. If they are not matched, reject it. 
 
 
Figure 7. Synchronization and Authentication  
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After the step 3, the server can verify 𝑚! and 𝑘𝑒𝑦1 from the sensor is matched 
with its 𝑚#. After the step 4, the sensors can verify 𝑘𝑒𝑦2 from the server is matched 
with its key pool. As a result, both the sensor and server authenticated each other as 
valid devices and their keys and key pools are synchronized. 
 
Authentication 
 In the authentication phase, the server and sensor authenticate each other through 
synchronized keys and key pools from the synchronization phase. After authentication, 
the sensor sends data to the server. If they authenticate each other successfully at first 
authentication, they do not need to synchronize their keys and key pool again. If they 
want to communicate again, they just need a simple authentication until they run out of 
all keys in the 2D key pool. The simple authentication phase is shown in Figure 8. 
Authentication procedures are defined as follows:  
(1) After receiving 𝑘𝑒𝑦13 from the sensor, the server calculates the new key’s row 
number 𝑟 as  𝑟	 = (𝑘𝑒𝑦2 − 𝑝_𝑘𝑒𝑦2)	𝑚𝑜𝑑	𝑛, where 𝑘𝑒𝑦2 is the server’s key, 
𝑝_𝑘𝑒𝑦2 is the previous key of 𝑘𝑒𝑦2. The subtraction with 𝑘𝑒𝑦2 and 𝑝_𝑘𝑒𝑦2 is 
calculated, and then a modular operation with 𝑛	is performed to get the row 
number 𝑟. 
(2) Afterwards, the server calculates the sub hash function ℎ% 𝑟 times and then 




(3) If 𝑘𝑒𝑦13 is matched with the calculated key which is ℎ%(𝑘𝑒𝑦) 	×	ℎ$(𝑘𝑒𝑦) 
(𝑟, 1~𝑛), the server selects the previous key of the matched key as 𝑘𝑒𝑦23 and 
sends it to the sensor. In addition, the server saves 𝑝_𝑘𝑒𝑦23, which is the previous 
key of 𝑘𝑒𝑦23, for the next authentication. If they are not matched, the server 
rejects this request. 
(4) The sensor receives 𝑘𝑒𝑦23 from the server and compares 𝑘𝑒𝑦23  with 𝑘𝑝(𝑟, 𝑐 −
1) which is the previous key of 𝑘𝑒𝑦13. If they are matched, the sensor subtracts 
𝑘𝑝(𝑟, 𝑐 − 1) from 𝑝_𝑘𝑒𝑦 which is the previous key of 𝑘𝑝(𝑟, 𝑐 − 1). After that, 
the sensor performs a modular operation with 𝑛 to get the new row number 𝑟. The 
new column number c is generated randomly by the sensor. Thus, a new 𝑘𝑒𝑦13 is 
 
Figure 8. Simple Authentication  
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selected as (𝑛𝑒𝑤	𝑟, 𝑛𝑒𝑤	𝑐). The sensor saves the new key 𝑘𝑒𝑦13 for the next 
authentication and sends data to the server.  
(5) For the new authentication, the server sends a new request to the sensor. The 
sensor sends 𝑚!, 𝑘𝑒𝑦13 without 𝑛 to the server. The server reloads 𝑘𝑒𝑦23 and 
𝑝_𝑘𝑒𝑦23 related to the sensor’s 𝑚!. Afterwards, the sever performs the same 




 In the analysis section, performance analysis and security analysis are described. 
The proposed protocol is compared with other related schemes [12-15, 17].  
Performance Analysis 
 The proposed protocol’s performance analysis result is compared with other 
related protocols and the result is described in this section.  
Table 2. Execution time for each operation [15] 
Operations Notation Execution time (ms) 
Modular Multiplication 𝑇6 0.027 
ECC-based Multiplication 𝑇16 0.304 
ECC-based Addition 𝑇4 0.001 
Exponentiation 𝑇7 0.297 
Inversion 𝑇8 0.008 
Hash Function 𝑇9 0.319 
Bilinear Pairing 𝑇: 2.373 
Random Number Generator 𝑇;<=  0 
 
This authentication protocol is tested on MacBook Air, macOS Big Sur version 
11.2.3, Apple M1 chip, and Memory 8GB. Sensor nodes are operated in Arduino 
ESP8266 Wi-Fi module. In the initial authentication phase, the server’s total computation 
cost is 80ms. After the initial authentication phase, the server’s total computation cost is 
reduced to 11ms.  
Computation cost for the sensor and server and communication cost for the entire 
authentication are compared. The computation cost comparison is shown in Table 3. 
However, due to hardware differences on each scheme and for accurate performance 
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comparison, Kumar et al.’s execution time list [15] is referred for each operation’s 
execution time and this list is shown in Table 2. In [15], they indicate 𝑇6 , 𝑇16 , 𝑇4, 𝑇7 , 
𝑇8 , 𝑇9 , 𝑇: , and 𝑇;<=  are Modular multiplication, ECC-based multiplication, ECC-based 
addition, Exponentiation, Inversion, Hash function, Bilinear pairing, and Random number 
generator, respectively. Their respective computation times are 0.027ms, 0.304ms, 
0.001ms, 0.297ms, 0.008ms, 0.319ms, 2.373ms, and 0ms.He, D et al. [12]’s protocol 
takes ECC-based multiplication, Bilinear pairing, and Hash function for authentication 
protocol. In their authentication, the sensor’s computation takes 4 ECC-based 
multiplication and 1 hash function (4𝑇16 + 1𝑇9) which is approximately 1.535ms, and 
the server takes 4 ECC-based multiplication, 2 bilinear pairing, and 1 hash function 
(4𝑇16 + 2𝑇: + 1𝑇9), which is approximately 6.281ms. K. Sowjanya et al. [13]’s 
protocol takes ECC-based multiplication and Modular multiplication. Its computation 
takes 3 ECC-based multiplications and 1 modular operation (3𝑇16 + 1𝑇6) which is 
0.939ms on the sensor and 6 ECC-based multiplication and 1 modular operation (6𝑇16 +
1𝑇6) which is approximately 1.851ms on the server. In M. Nikooghadam et al. [14]’s 
protocol, ECC-based multiplication, ECC-based addition, and Modular multiplication are 
used. This protocol’s sensor takes 3 ECC-based multiplication and 2 modular operation 
(3𝑇16 + 2𝑇6) which is approximately 0.966ms, and the server takes 4 ECC-based 
multiplication and 2 ECC-based addition (4𝑇16 + 2𝑇4) which is 1.218ms. Kumar et al. 
[15]’s protocol takes ECC-based multiplication and Modular multiplication for their 
authentication. In [15], the sensor takes 3 ECC-based multiplication and 2 modular 
operation (3𝑇16 + 2𝑇6) which is 0.966ms and the server takes 5 ECC-based 
multiplication (5𝑇16) which is approximately 1.851ms. In [17], the sensor only computes 
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Random number generator, and it is a significantly light and small computation. 
Therefore, its computation time is considered to be 0ms. The server in this protocol takes 
ECC-based multiplication, ECC-based addition, and Hash function, and its computation 
time is approximately 26.782ms. The proposed protocol takes the same operations as [17] 
but it reduced the server’s hash function computation time. As a result, total computation 
time on the server is reduced from 26.782ms to 11.47ms (48.2%). After the initial 
authentication, the server and sensor perform the simple authentication. Therefore, the 
server’s hash function calculations are reduced more from 35 times to 16 times which 
means that the computation cost will be reduced from 11.47ms to 5.409ms (47.1%).  
Table 3. Computation cost comparison 
Scheme Computation Cost (ms) 
Sensor Server 
He, D et al. [12] 4𝑇16 + 1𝑇9 (1.535) 4𝑇16 + 2𝑇: + 1𝑇9 (6.281) 
K. S et al. [13] 3𝑇16 + 1𝑇6 (0.939) 6𝑇16 + 1𝑇6 (1.851) 
M. N et al. [14] 3𝑇16 + 2𝑇6 (0.966) 4𝑇16 + 2𝑇4 (1.218) 
Kumar et al. [15] 3𝑇16 + 2𝑇6 (0.966) 5𝑇16 (1.52) 
Choi, S et al. [17] 1𝑇;<=  (0) 1𝑇16 + 1𝑇4 +	83𝑇9 (26.782) 
Proposed protocol 1𝑇;<=  (0) 1𝑇16 + 1𝑇4 +	35𝑇9 (11.47) 
After initial 
authentication 1𝑇;<=  (0) 1𝑇16 + 1𝑇4 +	16𝑇9 (5.409) 
 
Based on the result, this proposed protocol can provide a significantly lower 
computation burden for the sensor. Therefore, the sensors are not required to have high 
computation power and a big battery capacity. Moreover, in WBAN, we do not care 
about the server’s computation cost because they assume the server will be given a 
powerful computation ability for authentication. Therefore, it does not matter even 
though 11.47ms and 5.409ms are quite a big number compared to other protocols.  
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 For communication cost comparison, the proposed model is compared with other 
protocols [12-15] except [17] because [17]’s total message length (in bits) is the same as 
the proposed model. The result is shown in Table 4. In the result, the proposed model 
uses only 1280-bits length for the entire authentication procedure. However, K. Sowjanya 
et al. [13] uses 6672-bits length which means almost 5 times more than the proposed 
model. M. Nikooghadam et al. [14]’s protocol is the second lowest model, but it still uses 
2.5 times more than the proposed model. After the initial authentication, communication 
cost is reduced from 1280-bits to 768-bits through the simple authentication. It is one 
eight of K. Sowjanya et al. [13] and quarter of M. Nikooghadam et al. [14]’s protocol 
Thus, this proposed model uses the lowest length of bits for the authentication 
protocol. As a result, the proposed model is the lightest-weight model communication 
cost wise as well as computation cost wise, especially on the sensor side. 
Table 4. Communication cost comparison 
Scheme Length (in bits) 
He, D et al. [12] 4288 
K. S et al. [13] 6672 
M. N et al. [14] 3264 
Kumar et al. [15] 3440 





 For [17]’s authentication protocol, ECC and two hash functions SHA-256 and 
SHA-512 are used for the WBAN authentication protocol. For this proposed protocol, the 
same authentication techniques are used as [17]’s scheme. Therefore, security analysis 
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results will be the same as the [17]’s work. A 256-bits key is used for ECC to provide a 
128-bit security level which is the same as a 3072-bit key with RSA [21]. Hash functions 
SHA-256 and SHA-512 can provide 128-bit and 256-bit security level, respectively. 
Moreover, they are designed as non-reversible techniques; they are unbreakable if their 
keys are secure. For this protocol, the confidentiality of the hash functions’ keys can be 
guaranteed through ECC at a 128-bit security level. In addition, the hash functions’ round 
functions are modified to use a private key to be more secure. As a result, even if hash 
functions’ keys are exposed, the security level can be protected unless the private key is 
exposed. 















Mutual authentication X O O O O 
Perfect forward security O O X O O 
Session key establishment O O O O O 
Anonymity  X O O O O 
Non-repudiation X X X X O 
User impersonation attack X O O O O 
Server impersonation attack X O O O O 
Dos attack X O O X O 
KCI attack X X O O O 
 
 The proposed protocol’s security features are compared with other related 
protocols [12-15]. Table 4 shows the result of the comparison. According to the result, 
He, D et al. [12]’s protocol provides only perfect forward security and session key 
establishment. K. Sowjanya et al. [13]’s protocol can provide mutual authentication, 
perfect forward security, session key establishment, anonymity, user impersonation attack 
immunity, server impersonation attack immunity, and Dos attack immunity. In M. 
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Nikooghadam et al. [14]’s protocol, they can provide mutual authentication, session key 
establishment, anonymity, user and server impersonation attack immunity, Dos attack 
immunity, and key compromise impersonation (KCI) attack immunity. Kumar et al. 
[15]’s protocol provides mutual authentication, perfect forward security, session key 
establishment, anonymity, user and server impersonation attack immunity, and KCI 
attack immunity. The proposed model can provide mutual authentication, perfect forward 
security, session key establishment, anonymity, non-repudiation, user and server 
impersonation attack immunity, Dos attack immunity, and KCI attack immunity. As a 
result, the proposed model can support more security features than other related protocols 




  The study for security of WBAN is quite considerable and expanding because 
WBAN has emerged as a promising technique for healthcare systems. WBAN can 
provide a remote and continuous monitoring system for the health care field through tiny 
and compact sensors [1]. The sensors are located on, in, and around patient’s body to 
collect body function data. However, since this system uses a wireless network and the 
measured data is critical and life-related, we need to check whether the data is from 
rightly and securely identified sensors or not before any transaction begins. Therefore, we 
need to care about the security of WBAN to protect the data from any malicious attacks 
[2, 3]. In addition, the sensors are attached to patient’s body for a long time, therefore, to 
make sensors that have lightweight computation and low battery consumption is another 
challenge of WBAN [5].  This paper proposed an improved secure and lightweight 
authentication protocol for WBAN with ECC and 2D hash chain techniques. The key 
selection algorithm is modified to use subtraction-modular operation to solve inefficient 
key usage problem and too many hash functions on the server problem. As a result, the 
efficiency of key usage is increased and the number of hash function calculations on the 
server are reduced while providing the same security level as the previous scheme.  
 In future work, investigation of a way to further reduce the server’s computations 
is needed. The new key selection algorithm reduced the server’s computations 
significantly. However, even though the server has powerful computation ability, I think 
it would be best to reduce the number of calculations even more, because the more 
calculations there are, the higher the probability of error. Therefore, this investigation 
makes this authentication protocol more stable, secure, and lightweight protocol. 
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Moreover, we need to research about packet loss. When the server or sensor send a 
packet and lost it, then they need to send the packet again to recover transaction. 
However, in this case, a key is exposed, and it could make a chance for Man-in-the-
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